The standard assumption in the efficiency literature that firms desire to produce on the production frontier may not hold in an oligopolistic market where the production decisions of all firms will determine the market price, i.e. an increase in a firm's output level leads to a lower market clearing price and potentially-lower profits. This paper models both the production possibility set and the inverse demand function and identifies a Nash-Cournot equilibrium and improvement targets which may not be on the production frontier. This behavior is referred to as rational inefficiency because the firm reduces its productivity levels in order to increase profits.
Introduction
Standard productivity and efficiency analysis assumes perfectly competitive markets and exogenous prices (Cherchye et al., 2002) . Basic microeconomic theory states that firms operating in less than perfectly competitive markets can reduce production levels and increase a product's market price when they face a downward sloping demand curve. Considering a monopolistically competitive market, Johnson and Ruggiero (2011) demonstrate from a revenue efficiency perspective that a firm that increases output to become technically efficient may actually reduce its overall profits by increasing the market quantity, which in turn reduces the market price. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the endogenous prices of an oligopolistic market for a single product produced using a single input. The production frontier 1 in figure 1 represents technically efficient production. Firms A and B would like to expand their output levels 2 to increase their productivity, yet increasing the output levels will lead to a change in the market output quantity from Y to Y' (shown in figure 2 ) and the market price will fall from P to P'. This change in price may reduce the profits of both firms. Thus, the standard assumption in the efficiency literature that all firms desire to produce on the production frontier may not hold in an oligopolistic market (Cherchye et al., 2002; Johnson and Ruggiero, 2011) . A firm is said to be rationally inefficient when it tries to maximize revenues or profits, or alternatively, minimize costs by intentionally operating at lower productivity levels. This paper considers an oligopolistic market to estimate a firm's target production plans that may not be on the production frontier, but that maximize revenues or profits, or alternatively, minimize costs. The set of all firms' benchmark production plans is a Nash-Cournot oligopolistic market equilibrium.
Most of the efficiency and productivity literature adapts the work developed by Farrell (1957) and articulated by Leibenstein (1966) as concepts X-efficiency which assumes that deviations from a production frontier are due to managerial inefficiency, lack of motivation, and lack of knowledge (Leibenstein and Maital, 1994) . However, Stigler (1976) argues that firms and individuals are rational, meaning that what is observed as inefficiency is actually the difference 1 A production function is commonly defined as the maximum set of output(s) that can be produced with a given set of inputs. Thus we will use the terms production function and production frontier interchangeable as is commonly done in the productivity and efficiency literature (Fried et al., 2008) . 2 Firms will either expand their outputs, contract their inputs, or both, depending on the cost/price structure of inputs/outputs and adjustment costs associated with changing input levels. For now we will assume input adjustment costs are very large and consider only output adjustment consistent with an output oriented efficiency analysis in the efficiency literature, (Fare and Primont, 1995) . This assumption is relaxed in section 4.
between individual employees of the firm maximizing their individual value functions and the firm's value function. Following Stigler, Bogetoft and Hougaard (2003) suggest that if the inefficiency is due to lack of motivation, performance may be improved by redesigning the incentive structure to stimulate employees to save inputs and expand outputs. In the case that these incentives or enforcement cost are higher than the cost of the inefficiency, it is rational for the firm to allow inefficient operations. Modeling the firm's intention as maximizing profits and the employees' intention as maximizing slack, the Bogetoft and
Hougaard show the trade-offs between the consumption of different types of slack. Alternatively, Wibe (2008) considers a firm that does not scrap older equipment as new models become available. His dynamic production model demonstrates that a considerable proportion of crosssectional technical inefficiency can be rational economic behavior in terms of capital acquisition,
i.e. he shows the role of capital (fixed inputs) in rational inefficiency.
In this paper we propose that rational inefficiency may in fact be a result of endogenous prices and the effect of output production on price -and profits. Cournot (1838) , the first to consider endogenous prices, assumes a homogeneous product with an inverse demand function known to all firms which then independently select output levels; in this market characterized by imperfect competition, price is treated as an endogenous parameter. Nash (1950 Nash ( , 1951 ) considers more general non-cooperative games and defines a self-countering n-tuple as an equilibrium point in n-person games, i.e. for an equilibrium point, no firm can increase its objective function by unilaterally changing the quantity or price to any other feasible point. These games are consistent with the oligopolies described by Cournot where each firm maximizes its own profits and the output decisions affect the price faced by all firms. Rosen (1965) proves that a finite noncooperative game always has at least one equilibrium point when the strategy space of each player is restricted to a simplex and the payoff functions are a bilinear function of the strategies.
Further, for a constrained n-person game, he proves the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium point with a strictly concave payoff function. A systematic discussion applying equilibrium concepts to economic systems is developed in Arrow and Debreu (1954) . Discussing different classes of non-cooperative games, Milgrom and Roberts (1990) argue that all have identical bounds on the rationalizable strategies. In this paper we consider production strategies bounded by the production possibility set. Murphy et al. (1982) introduce a mathematical programming approach for finding Nash equilibria in oligopolistic markets. They show that if the revenue function is concave and the cost function is convex and continuously differentiable, and the inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable, then a Nash equilibrium solution exists if and only if a solution to the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions exist. Based on their study, Harker (1984) presents a variational inequality (VI) approach to find a Nash equilibrium using an iterative procedure called the diagonalization algorithm. Bonanno (1990) gives a comprehensive survey on equilibrium theory with imperfect competition.
We use a variational inequality approach to identify Nash equilibria when production is limited by an endogenously estimated production frontier. We focus on an oligopolistic market with endogenous prices and firms maximizing profits. We identify a Nash equilibrium in which each firm cannot improve its profit by changing production levels within the production possibility set. We find that, contrary to previous productivity and efficiency studies, under certain conditions some firms choose not to produce on the production frontier, and we interpret the behavior as rational inefficiency (choosing to be less productive in order to increase profits).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows the equivalence between a Nash equilibrium and the two approaches, variational inequalities and the complementarity problem, when production is restricted to the production possibility set.
Section 3 examines revenue maximization with fixed input levels. Both a single output case and a multiple output case are presented. Section 4 introduces a generalized profit model in which a firm maximizes profits by adjusting both input and output levels. The existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium identified through the complementarity problem is proven, and the relationship between the benchmark frontier and scale properties is discussed. Based on moving towards allocative efficient production, the direction for improvement used in the directional distance function is identified using the results of the Nash equilibrium analysis. Section 5 presents our conclusions.
Extending Approaches to Identify a Nash Equilibrium in Production Possibility Set
This section considers a general profit function and a production function with multiple inputs and multiple outputs, describes the conditions under which a Nash equilibrium solution exists, and how to identify it. We discuss the equivalence between the general concept of a Nash equilibrium and a set of variational inequalities and the complementary problem (CP) when production is limited to the production possibility set.
Let ‫ݔ‬ ∈ ܴ ା ூ denote the inputs and ‫ݕ‬ ∈ ܴ ା ொ denote the outputs of a production system. ܳ = 1 in the single output case. The production possibility set defined as ܶ = ሼሺ‫,ݔ‬ ‫ݕ‬ሻ: ‫ݔ‬ ܿܽ݊ ‫݁ܿݑ݀ݎ‬ ‫ݕ‬ሽ is estimated by a piece-wise linear convex function enveloping all observations (Farrell, 1957; Boles, 1967; Afriat, 1972; Charnes et al., 1978) . The boundary of the production possibility set is referred to as the production frontier. For firm ݇, ܺ is the ݅ ௧ input resource, ܻ is the amount of the ‫ݍ‬ ௧ production output, and ߣ is the multiplier to construct convex combinations. Equation (1) uses a dataset characterizing firms to estimate the smallest set that imposes monotonicity and convexity on the production function, the boundary of the production possibility set ܶ ෨ .
To identify a Nash equilibrium, the generalized profit function should be concave, the inverse demand function should be nonincreasing and continuously differentiable, and the inverse supply function should be nondecreasing and continuously differentiable. The variational inequality approach and mixed complementary problem (MCP) are proven to be alternative methods to calculating a Nash equilibrium within the production possibility set.
To discuss the equilibria in oligopolistic markets characterized by imperfect competition, we define a Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) with respect to production possibility set as:
Definition 1: Let ‫ܭ‬ be a finite number of players, ߠ a utility (profit) function, ܶ a strategy set (production possibility set) for player ݇ = 1, … , ‫,ܭ‬ and ሺ , ሻ = ൫‫ݔ‬ ଵ , … , ‫ݔ‬ ூ , ‫ݕ‬ ଵ , … , ‫ݕ‬ ொ ൯ ∈ ܶ an observed production vector; then a vector ሺ * , is concave and production is limited to a convex production possibility set. Generally, input markets are assumed to be competitive, in which case ܲ ሺ‫ݔ‬ + ܺ ሺିሻ ሻ is a constant, but in this case the lemma and the related results shown in theorems 1 and 2 and proven in section 4 still hold. Gabay and Moulin (1980) propose that a Nash equilibrium will satisfy a set of VI. We reformulate the VI set with respect to the production possibility set: Karamardian (1971) proves that each generalized complementary problem, i.e. KKT condition, corresponds to a set of VI. We extend this result and give the relationship between the complementary problem and the set of VI for the case when production is limited by the production possibility set as: 
Defining ࣳ as a random variable of quantity supplied in the market, we need a generalized form for the price function, ܲሺࣳ ሻ, to estimate the inverse demand function. If the inverse demand function is strictly decreasing and continuously differentiable, then the revenue function is concave and continuously differentiable, and a Nash equilibrium solution exists (Murphy et al., 1982) . For illustrative purposes, we assume a linear inverse demand function which satisfies these properties, i.e. ܲሺܻሻ = ܲ − ߙܻ, where ܲ is a positive intercept and ߙ indicates the nonnegative price sensitivity with respect to ܻ . (See appendix for a detailed discussion of the inverse demand function and the use of instrumental variables.) If ߙ = 0, then the price is constant regardless of the output level consistent with the standard analysis of allocative efficiency in the productivity and efficiency literature (Fried et al., 2008) , i.e. the price is exogenous as in the case of perfect competition.
In the single-output revenue model (2) with a linear inverse demand function, we use the CP to find the Nash equilibrium solution. We define the Lagrangian function as:
The MCP is:
If the MCP gives the solutions ܲሺܻሻ < 0, or ‫ݕ‬ < 0, i.e. the inverse demand function returns a negative value, or the production output level is less than zero, this Nash equilibrium solution is inconsistent with production theory. Clearly, the sales price of a product cannot be negative.
Similarly, if production will cause a profit loss, a firm's best strategy is to shut down, i.e. the output level will be zero. Thus, we show that a Nash solution satisfies these two properties.
Lemma 2: A Nash solution to MCP problem (3) will satisfy ‫ݕ‬ ≥ 0 and ܲሺܻሻ ≥ 0.
Given ܲ > 0 and ߙ ≥ 0, a small ߙ means that a change in quantity of output will not affect the price significantly, but a large α will greatly affect the price. If the industry output level changes, the price will drop significantly and the revenues for all firms will likely decrease.
Therefore, the firms have an incentive to restrict production to keep the price -and revenueshigh. The same output level chosen by all firms is characterized by a common output level ‫ݕ‬ ത .
The revenue maximizing benchmarks constitute a Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between a Nash equilibrium and single-input-single-output production function, given parameter α.
Theorem 3:
If ܲሺܻሻ = ܲ − ߙܻ ≥ 0 and α is a small enough positive parameter, the Nash equilibrium solution is for all firms to produce on the production frontier.
Theorem 4:
If ܲሺܻሻ = ܲ − ߙܻ ≥ 0 and α is a large enough positive parameter, the MCP will lead to a benchmark output level with ‫ݕ‬ = ‫ݕ‬ ഥ close to zero, where ‫ݕ‬ ഥ defines a truncated output level.
Figure 3 Nash equilibrium and α parameter adjustment
We select a dataset from Dyson et al. (1990) describing a set of distribution centers for a large supermarket organization to illustrate the single-output NEP. The two inputs are stocks and wages. The outputs correspond to the activities of the distribution center (DC). The three output variables available are: 1) number of issues representing deliveries to supermarkets, 2) number of receipts in bulk from suppliers, and 3) number of requisitions to suppliers. In this illustrative example, we only use the number of issues as a single output variable and assume a simple inverse demand function ܲሺܻሻ = 100 − ߙܻ . Table 1 shows the best strategy for output expansion or contraction, given different price sensitivity values, ߙ. As discussed, a firm's best strategy is to produce on the production frontier if the ߙ value is small; alternatively, as ߙ increases the benchmark function becomes truncated. Note that regardless of the value of ߙ, the price and output quantity are always larger than zero as stated in lemma 2. 
Multiple-output Model
To build a demand function for multiple differentiated substitutable products, we use the affine demand function proposed by Farahat and Perakis (2010) This property holds for product ‫ݍ‬ if the main effect ߙ caused by the same product is more intense than the minor effect ߙ created by another substitute product.
3) Symmetric matrix: a symmetric matrix ࢻ implies an equivalent bidirectional effect between any two substitute products.
4) Strong diagonal dominance (SDD): ߙ ≫ ‫݉ݑݏ‬ሺࢻሻ − ‫ݎݐ‬ሺࢻሻ for all ‫ݍ‬ , where ‫݉ݑݏ‬ሺࢻሻ
denotes the sum of all elements in matrix ࢻ and ‫ݎݐ‬ሺࢻሻ denotes the trace which represents the sum of the elements on the diagonal of matrix ࢻ. SDD means that each product's quantity level generates a powerful main effect on the product's price.
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The WDD property is likely to be true because, in general, the price of product A is more likely to be affected by the quantity produced of A than by the quantity produced of the substitute product B. We use the following formulation (4) to identify the optimal output levels:
Note that to identify a Nash equilibrium, the objective function has to be a strictly concave function in all arguments. Let ܴ = ∑ ∑ ܲ ൫ܻ , ሺିሻ ൯‫ݕ‬
, giving To solve the Nash equilibrium of formulation (4), we construct the complementary problem and define the Lagrangian function as:
The MCP is: , and ‫ݕ‬ ≥ 0:
Theorem 5 is important because the relationship between price sensitivity matrix ࢻ and the Nash equilibrium solution that can be identified from the characteristic of matrix ࢻ gives insights into the Nash equilibrium regarding the elements in matrix ࢻ. The more price sensitive the product the more likely a firm will hold back production in order to increase its revenue.
Even if a large ߙ results in a truncated benchmark production level, it does not necessarily result in a common output value for all firms, because some firms may be limited by the production frontier. Referring to figure 3, ܺ is the smallest input value to generate the truncated benchmark output level. Note that the production processes using an input quantity between 0 and ܺ will identify a benchmark on the production frontier. Without loss of generality and ‫ݕ‬ > 0 from MCP (6), we have ܲ ൫ܻ , ሺିሻ ൯ − ߙ ‫ݕ‬ − ∑ ߙ ‫ݕ‬ ஷ ≥ 0; therefore:
If for product ‫ݍ‬ of firm ‫ݎ‬ the efficient output level ‫ݕ‬ is lower than the truncated level ‫ݕ‬ ത , that is, the production frontier limits output level ‫ݕ‬ , then ‫ݕ‬ can exceed the truncated benchmark level ‫ݕ‬ ത for some product ℎ, because ‫ݕ‬ is smaller than the truncation level ‫ݕ‬ ത , and Again, we use our two-output illustrative example from the dataset described in section 3.1. The two output variables are the number of issues and the number of receipts, and the two inputs are stocks and wages. The inverse demand functions for issues and receipts are
respectively. Table 2 reports the Nash equilibrium solution to the MCP (6) for different price sensitivity matrix ࢻ, all of which satisfy the WDD property. Once more a firm's best strategy is to produce as close to the efficient frontier as possible for products with an insensitive inverse demand function implied by smaller values in the diagonal components of the ࢻ matrix shown in case 1. As ߙ becomes larger the benchmark output level is truncated and approaches zero with respect to product ‫.ݍ‬ In cases 2 the parameter ߙ భ భ is larger than case 1, the output ‫ݍ‬ ଵ decreases and output ‫ݍ‬ ଶ increases to maximize revenue. Similar in case 3, ߙ మ మ is increased relative to case 1 and the output ‫ݍ‬ ଶ decreases. In case 4 the parameter ߙ మ మ increases with respect to case 2, the solution shows output ‫ݍ‬ ଶ decreases to the truncated benchmark level. Increasing ߙ భ భ in cases 5 and 6, output ‫ݍ‬ ଵ approaches zero even though the ࢻ matrices do not satisfy the symmetric condition. In cases 7 and 8 ߙ భ భ = 2ߙ మ మ and the results indicate that the ratio of output levels ‫ݍ‬ ଵ and ‫ݍ‬ ଶ are influence not only by the ratio of ߙ భ భ to ߙ మ మ , but also by their absolute levels. Table 2 Nash equilibrium in two-output production Note that case 6 in Table 2 , the price of product ‫ݍ‬ ଵ (issues) is less than 0, an unreasonable negative price, yet the revenue function is still equal to zero because ܻ భ = 0. Adding another constraint to restrict the price to be larger than zero will cause the quantity of product ‫ݍ‬ ଶ to drop, which results in a worse outcome. 
Generalized Profit Maximization Model
This section defines a short-run profit model of an oligopolistic output market with a limited capacity input market, we only change the variable inputs, e.g., capital stock for production is fixed and employment or materials vary with demand (Marshall, 1920) . Stigler (1939) argues that the quantitative variations of output can be described via the law of diminishing returns and marginal productivity theory when holding constant all but one of the productive factors and adjusting the quantity of the remaining factor. Thus, our generalized model treats fixed inputs and variable inputs separately.
This section also looks at the case of variable input markets with limited capacity and oligopolistic output markets, assuming that the inverse supply function of inputs and the inverse demand function of output are linear (see section 3 and the appendix). We formulate our generalized profit maximization model as equation (8):
where ܺ ி is the data for fixed input ݅ and ‫ݔ‬ is the decision variable for variable input ݆ of firm ி since it is a constant sunk cost. 10 The intuition for case 6 can be built using the single-output case considering only product ‫ݍ‬ 2 . The related problem of negative demand in demand function is modified using the price mappings (described in Shubik and Levitan (1980) , Soon, et al. (2009), and Farahat and Perakis (2010) . The MCP is:
The Nash equilibrium solution generated from MCP (9) exists and is unique when the price sensitivity matrices ࢻ and ࢼ satisfy the WDD property. See section 4.1 for a similar proof.
In a perfectly competitive market, the profit efficient firms, i.e. achieving maximum profits (Farrell, 1957) , must be allocatively efficient by using the least cost mix of inputs to produce the maximum revenue mix of outputs, and technically efficient by generating the most outputs with their level of inputs, (Färe, et al., 1994) . In oligopolistic markets, however, profit maximization can be achieved without technical efficiency, i.e. rational inefficiency. We will continue to refer to the profit maximizing production possibility as allocatively efficient because it is not possible to change either the input mix or the output mix to increase profits. MCP (9) generates an allocatively efficient Nash solution.
Theorem 6: Given arbitrary price sensitivity matrices ࢻ and ࢼ that satisfy WDD, MCP (9) generates all allocatively efficient Nash solutions ሺܺ ி , ‫ݔ‬ * , ‫ݕ‬ * ሻ ∈ ܶ ෨ . These solutions are on the frontier including the weakly efficient frontier 12 , but excluding the portion of the frontier associated with positive slacks and dual variables equal to zero on the input constraints.
Theorem 6 implies that the Nash equilibrium benchmark generated from MCP (9) exists on the production frontier using the same or fewer inputs than at least one anchor point, (Bougnol and Dulá, 2009) . 13 Based on theorem 5, if ߙ becomes large, the production level will approach zero with respect to ‫ݍ‬ and the Nash solution will be located on the weakly efficient portion of the production frontier which uses minimal input levels. In other words, if the price sensitivity to output is large enough, the Nash equilibrium benchmark suggests that a firm should operate on the weakly efficient portion of the frontier where more output can be generated using the same level of inputs. In this case, note that the profits are maximized by operating inefficiently, motivating the connection to rational inefficiency.
12 Weakly efficient frontier is defined as the portion of the input (output) isoquant along which one of the inputs (outputs) can be reduced (expanded) while holding all other netputs constant and remaining on the isoquant; see Färe and Lovell (1978) for more details. 13 Bougnol and Dulá (2009) propose a procedure to identify anchor points and show that if a point is an anchor point, then increasing an input or decreasing an output generates a new point on the free-disposability portion of the production possibility set.
The illustrative example of the generalized profit model also uses the dataset in section 3.
The two output variables are the number of issues and the number of receipts, and the two variable inputs are stocks and wages. One fixed input is randomly generated from a Uniform Table 3 reports the Nash equilibrium solution to MCP (9) for the price sensitivity matrices ࢻ and ࢼ, all of which satisfy the WDD property. Again, for outputs with insensitive inverse demand functions implied by smaller values in the diagonal components of the ࢻ matrix, a firm's best strategy is to produce near the efficient frontier; as ߙ becomes large, the production approaches zero with respect to ‫ݍ‬ as shown in case 4. Similarly on the input side, for inputs with sensitive inverse supply functions implied by larger values in the diagonal components of the ࢼ matrix, the best strategy is to use smaller input levels to produce on the weakly efficient frontier; as ߚ becomes smaller, the input level of the Nash equilibrium solution grows larger. However, the price sensitivity value ࢼ will affect the price of Nash solution significantly, cost will increase quickly and profits will drop. Cases 1, 2 and 3 show that as ߚ మ మ increases, costs also increase and producers have less incentive to produce. Cases 4 and 5 decrease the output level due to changes in the ࢻ matrix; in particular, case 5 illustrates rational inefficiency because firms hold back producing additional output in order to maximize profits. 
Existence and Uniqueness
If a Nash equilibrium does not exist, there is no purpose in talking about its properties, identification, etc. Further, if multiple equilibria exist, it is not clear which might result in any particular case. In this section we prove the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium solution identified by the MCP.
Theorem 7: MCP (9) generates a Nash equilibrium solution ሺ ி , * , * ሻ ∈ ܶ ෨ .
To get a unique Nash equilibrium, a strictly concave profit function is assumed. Given a convex production possibility set, theorem 8 states the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 8:
If the profit function is a strictly concave function on ( ி , , ሻ ∈ ܶ ෨ that is continuous and differentiable and the price sensitivity matrices ࢻ and ࢼ satisfy the WDD property, then the Nash equilibrium solution found using MCP (9) is unique if a solution exists for the maximization problem.
Price Sensitivity and Returns to Scale
It is necessary to understand the relationship between the price sensitivity matrices ࢻ and ࢼ and the returns to scale (RTS) properties of the Nash equilibrium benchmarks. To address RTS properties, we must first identify the most productive scale size (MPSS). The production frontier is characterized by three regions: constant returns to scale (CRS), increasing returns to scale (IRS), and decreasing returns to scale (DRS). The MPSS can be identified for firm ‫'ݎ‬s input and output mix using the input-oriented CRS DEA technique formulated in (10). If the sum of ∑ ߣ ோௌ = 1 in the input-oriented CRS DEA 14 , we can identify such observations as operating at the MPSS (Banker, 1984) :
Let ݇ ெௌௌ denote the set of observations having the MPSS property, one for each firm ‫ݎ‬ in the dataset, and let ‫ݕ‬ * and ‫ݔ‬ * be the Nash equilibrium solutions obtained from MCP (9). Using these additional observations as the reference set, optimization problem (11) can be used to identify the returns to scale property for each production plan in the Nash solution.
14 Note there are potential multiple optimal solutions. See Zhu (2000) For a one-input one-output production process, figure 4 depicts the true production function as a solid curve, the CRS estimated frontier as a straight dashed line, the VRS estimated frontier as a piece-wise linear bold dashed line, and the MPSS as Point B. In particular, based on theorem 6 the Nash equilibrium generated from MCP (9) should be located on the bold dashed lines. ܺ and ܺ ா are the upper and lower bounds for the variable input level.
Figure 4 Nash equilibrium on bold dashed lines
Corollary 2: Assume all input and output variables are normalized to eliminate unit dependence, and the price of outputs dominates the price of inputs to ensure a positive marginal profit. Given a production frontier including three portions: IRS, CRS, and DRS, the MCP (9) generates a 15 In (9) note that both inputs and outputs are defined as adjustable; thus, all Nash equilibria are located on the production frontier. If this is not the case, for example if there are adjustment costs when changing input levels (Choi et al., 2006) , then some equilibria may not be on the frontier as shown in figure 3. For these equilibria RTS are not defined because RTS is a frontier property. In (11) if ߠ is not equal to 1, then RTS is not defined for that production possibility; see for example Seiford and Zhu (1999) or Ray (2010) . Nash equilibrium solution that is characterized by DRS when the inverse demand and supply functions are less sensitive, or the Nash equilibrium is characterized by IRS when the inverse demand and supply functions are more sensitive.
Extending the illustrative example in section 2, we use formulation (11) to identify the RTS property of the Nash equilibrium solution shown in table 3; DCs 3, 10, 12, 15, and 19 are identified as operating at MPSS. Table 4 shows the RTS associated with the Nash solutions for cases 1 through 5 in table 3. Based on corollary 2, the sensitivity of output and sensitivity of input are the two oppositional forces in terms of scale. Case 1 represents a baseline and the Nash solutions present CRS or DRS properties. The sensitivity parameter of the supply function in case 2 increases relative to case 1, which encourages firms to hold back on the consumption of inputs, i.e. more DCs operate at MPSS in case 2. If we further increase the sensitivity parameter of the supply function, all DCs operate at MPSS in case 3. Case 4 results in all firms operating at MPSS or IRS, by increasing the sensitivity parameter of the demand function and leaving the sensitivity parameter of the supply function parameter the same as in case 1. Case 5 shows that all firms operate at IRS and on the weakly efficient portion of the frontier. This demonstrates the concept of rational inefficiency. Table 4 Returns to scale of Nash equilibrium 
Allocative Efficiency and Directional Distance Function
The Nash equilibrium identified by using (9) is an allocatively efficient solution as shown in theorem 6. Zofio and Prieto (2006) suggest choosing the direction in the direction distance function (DDF) to move towards the allocatively efficient point. We extend their suggestion to the case of oligopolistic markets and suggest that each firm should select the direction for improvement in the DDF to move towards its Nash equilibrium benchmark.
The DDF as defined by Chambers et al. (1996; 1998) is the simultaneous contraction of inputs and expansion of outputs:
where ߜ is the distance measure and ௫ ೇ , ௬ are the direction vectors for variable inputs and outputs respectively. Recall that since we do not change the fixed inputs in the short run, no direction is associated with them. We estimate the DDF for firm ‫ݎ‬ as:
Because the method for selecting a direction ൫ ௫ ೇ , ௬ ൯ is an open issue, the direction ሺ−, ሻ is usually chosen for simplicity. Alternatively, Frei and Harker (1999) determine the least-norm projection from an inefficient firm to the frontier, but this direction is non-proportional and is not unit-invariant. Färe et al. (2011) estimate an endogenous direction, but it is void of economic meaning. Therefore, we propose that firms' direction for improvement move towards the allocatively efficient benchmark identified by the Nash equilibrium. Thus, the direction is firmspecific and can be calculated by following the equation for firm ‫:ݎ‬
where * and * are the benchmarks determined by the Nash equilibrium, and are the vectors of the current variable input and output production, and ‖•‖ is the Euclidean norm. This ratio imposes ൫ ௫ ೇ , ௬ ൯ is a unit vector.
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Extending the example in table 3, case 1, we calculate the direction of improvement associated with this example as shown in table 5. The results indicate that when trying to maximize overall economic efficiency 17 using formulation (8) it is not necessary to contract the variable inputs and expand the outputs. To maintain higher price and profit maximization, firm ‫ݎ‬ may achieve economic efficiency by changing its mix to become allocatively efficient. However, no firm takes a direction which increases all variable inputs and decreases all output levels as this would lead to a loss in profit. 
Conclusion
This paper analyzes endogenous prices in productivity analysis. Given inverse demand and supply functions, a Nash equilibrium solution corresponding to profit maximization production plan within the production possibility set is identified using a mixed complementary problem (MCP). When the inverse demand and supply functions are constant functions, the standard analysis of efficiency assuming perfect competition and exogenous prices follows. For markets in which demand is heavily influence by the total supply quantity, firms seek to decrease their output levels and maintain higher product prices to maximize profits. The proposed MCP model integrates oligopolistic market equilibrium and productivity analysis. We find that the resulting Nash equilibrium is an example of rational inefficiency.
Deviating from standard economic analysis, we consider the production limitations estimated from observed data and interpret the Nash equilibrium as the benchmark, or the production plans each of the firms should work towards for more profitable production. Our work extends the efficiency literature on demand functions by considering multiple output production and allowing both outputs and variable inputs to be adjusted by the firm. Prior work primarily focused on individual firms decisions without consideration for the other firms in the market.
The identification of a unique Nash equilibrium allows further insights to operational improvement strategies. We show the relationship between price sensitivity and returns to scale in the Nash equilibrium. Based on the concept of allocative efficiency, we conclude that the Nash equilibrium is a useful guide for determining direction in the directional distance function.
Weak, Moderate, and Strong Dominance Properties
Lemma 3: In the two-output product case, if matrix ࢻ satisfies MDD and symmetric properties, then matrix ࢻ satisfies SDD.
Proof: If matrix ࢻ satisfies MDD and symmetric properties, it will spontaneously lead to the transitivity property, which implies that the main effect of each product dominates the minor effect of the other products, i.e. the SDD property.
Lemma 4: If price sensitivity matrix ࢻ satisfies the SDD property, then solving MCP (5) generates a solution such that ‫ݕ‬ ≥ 0 and ܲ ൫ܻ , ሺିሻ ൯ ≥ 0 where ∀ሺܺ , ‫ݕ‬ ሻ ∈ ܶ ෨ . 
Cost minimization case
In the case of a single fixed input and a single variable input and a given output level, figure 5 illustrates the Nash equilibrium solution obtained by minimizing costs. Each firm attempts to adjust its variable input to reach the isoquant, holding a fixed input constant in the short run.
Figure 5 Adjusted variable input in Nash equilibrium
We construct a multi-input cost model to identify a Nash equilibrium solution using MCP. The result shows that the Nash equilibrium solution is on the production frontier regardless of the ࢼ matrix selected. In particular, to formulate the MCP with multiple variable inputs, first we define the Lagrangian function as:
Then the resulting MCP problem is:
In the cost minimization case a Nash equilibrium generated from MCP (15) exists on the production frontier, given an arbitrary ࢼ matrix with all nonnegative components satisfying WDD.
Proof: Proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium is similar to theorem 7. The Nash equilibrium generated from MCP will stay on the production frontier, given an arbitrary ࢼ matrix satisfying WDD. If an equilibrium output vector exists and ‫ݔ‬ > 0 , then it must satisfy the first order condition of MCP. From the complementary condition, we have the following first order condition:
which can be expressed in matrix notation as: elements. This implies that it is necessary to set ൫∑ ߣ ܺ − ‫ݔ‬ ൯ = 0 in terms of MCP; the upper bound of input level is characterized by the least value at the free disposability hull of inputs and the lower bound is the input level described by the free disposability hull of outputs shown in theorem 6. Because ൫∑ ߣ ܺ − ‫ݔ‬ ൯ = 0, that is, for cost minimization, the whole quantity of supply market would be minimized to reach a lower price at the inverse supply function, a firm's best strategy is to reduce its input level and to produce on the production frontier.
Generalized profit model as revenue maximization case
In a special case of the revenue model, we assume that the output level directly follows the variable input, namely, the level of variable input determines and controls the level of output. For example, in the semiconductor manufacturing industry raw silicon wafers are released into the production line to generate the actual die output. If the yield is 100%, the output level is a linear function of the variable input level. Assuming a constant unit cost of the variable input, we
formulate the profit maximization model as: 
